Conflict of Laws - Choice of Law in Torts - The Significant Contacts Doctrine in Colorado - Briola v. Roy by Arrington, Roger W.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 2 Article 8 
March 2021 
Conflict of Laws - Choice of Law in Torts - The Significant 
Contacts Doctrine in Colorado - Briola v. Roy 
Roger W. Arrington 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Roger W. Arrington, Conflict of Laws - Choice of Law in Torts - The Significant Contacts Doctrine in 
Colorado - Briola v. Roy, 48 Denv. L.J. 294 (1971). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
COMMENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS - CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTS - The Sig-
nificant Contacts Doctrine in Colorado. - Briola v. Roy, 459
P.2d 288 (Colo. 1969).
O N June 30, 1966, Elizabeth A. Briola, a domiciliary of Colo-
rado, was involved in an accident while driving her car
some 3 miles from Turlock, California. Mabel T. Roy, also
a resident of Colorado and a passenger in Mrs. Briola's car,
suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident. Mrs. Roy
brought suit in Colorado claiming damages under the California
Guest Statute.1 Both attorneys pleaded and argued California
law,2 and the jury was instructed on the proper application
of the California statute.- The verdict was in favor of Mrs. Roy
and Mrs. Briola appealed.
Counsel for both parties submitted briefs on California law
to the Colorado Supreme Court but were informed by the court
at oral argument that the Colorado Guest Statute would con-
trol.4 Although the decision of the trial court was affirmed,5
the "willful misconduct" language argued by the appellant in
I Roy v. Briola, Civil No. B99587 (2d Dist. Ct. Colo., June 14, 1968).
2 In the plaintiff's Pre-Trial Data Certificate she pleaded that "[T]he plain-
tiff will rely upon the following Statutes of the State of California...."
(The first statute cited was CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)). In Defendant's Answer it was argued that
"[P]laintiff's Complaint and cause of action are barred by the State of
California Vehicle Code, Section 17158."
3 Instruction #6 stated: "[Slince the accident of June 30, 1966 ... occurred
in the State of California, the statutes cf that state regulating vehicular
traffic on its highways are applicable." Judge Pinchick also cited the
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 to the jury, which reads as follows:
No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle
upon a highway without giving compensation for such a
ride.., has a right of action for civil damages against the
driver of the vehicle.., on account of personal injuries...
unless that injury resulted from the willful misconduct of
the driver.
§ 17158 (West 1960), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
4 According to Reed L. Winbourn, attorney for the appellant, Justice
Pringle informed the attorneys during oral argument that the court
would use the significant contacts doctrine instead of the old lex loci
delicti doctrine. The Colorado Guest Statute, cited by the supreme court
at 459 P.2d at 289 (Colo. 1969), provides that:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest ... shall have a cause of action for
damages against such owner cr operator for injury ... unless
such accident shall have been intentional . . . or caused by . . .
intoxication, or by negligence consisting of a willful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
5 Briola v. Roy, 459 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1969).
COMMENT
the second assignment of error," referring to the California
Guest Statute, appeared in the supreme court's opinion as
"intentional disregard ' 7 and "willful and wanton misconduct, '"
the language of the Colorado Guest Statute.
Of central importance to the analysis of Briola is the fact
that the Colorado Supreme Court applied Colorado law to a
California tort. The court's action in this regard appears to be
in direct conflict with the doctrine of lex loci delicti which has
been the undisputed law in Colorado since 1887. 9 The lex loci
rule provides that the substantive law of the state in which
the tort occurred controls the litigation.' ' In the instant case
there is no doubt that the tort occurred in California. By apply-
ing the Colorado Guest Statute in Briola, the court apparently
disregarded the doctrine of lex loci; yet, at no point in Justice
Day's opinion is the choice of law issue raised or discussed.
Prior to the instant case, the Colorado Supreme Court had
manifested no inclination to alter the established precedent in
this area of conflict of laws. In the earlier case of Pando v.
Jasper," a passenger sued the driver for injuries suffered in an
accident in Kansas. Both parties were domiciliaries of Colorado,
and no other cars were involved. The case was tried in Colo-
rado, and the court reaffirmed longstanding precedent by stat-
ing that, in such a situation, "[P]laintiff's claim is governed
by the lex loci delicti .... '" Although the Kansas Guest Statute
was not applied because of the defendant's failure to include
the statute in his pleadings, this case has been repeatedly cited
as the controlling statement on Colorado choice of law in torts.' 3
Nine months before Briola, the Colorado Federal District
Court cited Pando as controlling in Bannowsky v. Krauser.14 The
acts alleged in that wrongful death action occurred in Colorado
" Id. at 289.
7 Id. at 291.
8 Id. at 290.
9' Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
"' See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934); R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 317 (rev. ed. 1968); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 200 (1971).
11 133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956).
12 Id. at 323, 295 P.2d at 230.
' 3 Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12, 19 (1964); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
"Foreseeable and Insurable Laws: 1," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 601 (1960);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 21, 37 (1959); Smith, Choice
of the Applicable Law in Colorado, 35 DICTA 162, 173 (1958); Storke,
Another Decade of Colorado Conflicts, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 139, 148
(1960); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 215, 234 (1963).
14 294 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D. Colo. 1969).
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while the plaintiff was a domiciliary of New Mexico. In response
to arguments made by the plaintiff for the application of
New Mexico law, the court stated that "[W] e are not pre-
sented with any evidence which would indicate that the Colo-
rado Supreme Court is likely to embrace the new conflict of
law principle."'15
The new principle alluded to in Bannowsky is the signifi-
cant contacts doctrine.10 This rule, a relatively new approach in
conflict of laws, was first introduced in the New York case of
Babcock v. Jackson17 and has since been adopted by 21 states.18
It allows the court to give "controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with
the occurrence or parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation."'19
Under such analysis, Briola v. Roy could have been tried
under Colorado law, as California had little contact with the
parties or the occurrence. However, before it can be said that
the court has actually adopted the significant contacts doctrine,
it remains to be determined whether, under these circumstances,
the court could have applied Colorado law to a California tort
without resorting to a significant contacts analysis.
Two possible alternatives come to mind and should be con-
15 Id. The court footnoted in its entirety the balancing of interests test
found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1964) which was argued by plaintiff:
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the cccurrence and with the parties deter-
mines their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in
determining the state of the most significant relationship
include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts,
the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort,
and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested
states.
16 The specific label "significant contacts" is relatively unimportant. Other
variations on this theme include "center of gravity," "significant inter-
ests," and, most recently, "interest analysis." The import of these doc-
trines is that they all negate the lex loci delicti doctrine. For a brief
summary in this area see 23 ME. L. REV. 242-47 (1971). For a more
detailed analysis see D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965);
Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on
Reading Cavers, The Choice of Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 141
(1967); 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 551-654 (1968).
17 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
18 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 10, at 234-35 lists the following states and their
leading cases on significant contacts: Alas., Ariz., Cal., D.C., Ill., Ind.,
Iowa, Ky., Me., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., Pa.,
R.I., Tex., Wis.
19 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
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sidered. If California law had not been pleaded, the court could
have applied Colorado law by following Pando's holding with
respect to the Kansas Guest Statute. However, as has been dis-
cussed, the attorneys did plead the California Guest Statute,
and the court accepted their arguments. Since the trial judge
also instructed the jury as to the specific California law, there
is no possibility that the Colorado Guest Statute was applied
under a Pando rationale.
Had the court felt that the provisions of the guest statute
were procedural, as opposed to substantive, the Colorado Guest
Statute could have been applied without resorting to the signifi-
cant contacts doctrine.2 0 A standard definition to follow in ana-
lyzing the problem is, "If .. . the foreign rule in issue is not
especially difficult to find and apply and if there is any prob-
ability that the rule may affect the outcome, the rule should be
considered 'substantive' . . . .,,21 The California Guest Statute
was obviously easy to find. Moreover, its requirements for neg-
ligence demanded the lesser evidentiary showing of "willful
misconduct" as compared to the Colorado Statute's "intentional"
and "willful and wanton." This suggests that the choice of guest
statute might have affected the outcome, thereby making the
law substantive, not procedural.
Based on the foregoing it seems reasonable to conclude that
the Colorado Supreme Court did apply the significant contacts
rule to an out-of-state tort without mentioning the issue in its
opinion. Because of the similarity of the statutes involved and
the simplicity of the fact pattern, the court was able to embrace
the significant contacts analysis without a detailed discussion.
The absence of such discussion, however, has resulted in con-
siderable confusion as to what the law really is.
Significant contacts is not an easy doctrine to apply, as
other states have discovered. 22 A more complex fact pattern
21 See Parker v. Plympton, 85 Colo. 87, 102, 273 P. 1030, 1035 (1929):
"[M]atters of practice and procedure are almost universally governed by
the law of the forum. This is so even when the substantive laws of dif-
ferent states are involved .... "
21 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 10, at 46. See also Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260,
268, 14 P.2d 1087, 1091 (1932): "[W]e mean by substantive law the posi-
tive law of duties and rights which gives rise to a cause of action, as
distinguished from adjective law, which pertains to practice and pro-
cedure, or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is made
effective."
22 See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); Reich v. Pur-
cell 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). See also the cases which followed
Babcock: Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380,
274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394,
301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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plus a detailed set of criteria for balancing the interests23 could
combine to complicate application and cause confusion. The
Colorado Supreme Court has not circumvented the difficulties
involved in changing the law by simply refusing to analyze or
discuss the issue. Because of this omission, it is probable that
the legal community remains unaware of the application of
significant contacts in Colorado. Moreover, the few attorneys
cognizant of the court's action in Briola have no local guidelines
for arguing the significant contacts doctrine in the future.
In 1887, the Colorado Supreme Court felt that any departure
from lex loci delicti "would be more likely to lead to confusion
and oppression than to any beneficial results. '24 The current
court has made that prediction come true for no necessary rea-
son. Hopefully, the court will take steps to clarify the ambigu-
ous import of Briola, and continue to perform its duty of pro-
viding the Colorado legal profession with a clear statement
of the law.
Roger W. Arrington
23 See note 15 supra for an example.
24 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 438, 15 P. 821, 824
(1887) Citing Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 471 (1861).
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